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Abstract 
Kant’s account of practical justification for belief has attracted much attention in the 
literature, especially in recent years. In this context, scholars have generally emphasized the 
originality of Kant’s thought about belief (Glaube), and  Kant indeed offers a definition of 
belief that is very different from views that were prevalent in eighteenth-century Germany. In 
this paper, however, I argue that it is very likely that Christian August Crusius exerted 
influence on Kant’s definition of belief and his account of practical justification. In turn, 
acknowledging this influence has relevant consequences for how we understand the 
phenomenology of Kantian belief. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of studies on Kant’s account of assent, 
or taking-to-be-true (Fürwahrhalten), as it is developed, for example, in the Canon of Pure 
Reason of the Critique of Pure Reason. In this respect, scholars have read the section on 
‘Having an Opinion, Knowing and Believing’ as presenting detailed and original 
considerations on different kinds of propositional attitudes. Such studies have both 
emphasized the relevance of these considerations to current debates and dealt with apparent 
inconsistencies in Kant’s text. One of the issues that has attracted much attention is Kant’s 
concept of belief  (Glaube), which has a narrower meaning in Kant than in contemporary 
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discourse. For Kant, belief is a positive propositional attitude that is not a candidate for 
knowledge (Wissen) and is justified on practical grounds.1 
Works on this topic have generally emphasized the originality of Kant’s account of belief 
(and related concepts) with respect to the positions defended by his predecessors and 
contemporaries. Luca Fonnesu, for example, has argued that Kant introduces a new 
understanding of the concepts of belief and moral certainty. Before Kant, ‘belief’ referred to 
assent based on the testimony of others, whereas moral certainty referred to a highly probable 
proposition that could be held for certain in a determinate practical context. That is to say, 
prior to Kant, moral certainty had nothing to do with morality or ethics, and belief did not 
equate to assent based on distinctly practical grounds (Fonnesu 2011; see also Fonnesu 
2015).2 In a related way, Lawrence Pasternack has maintained that Kant’s considered account 
of belief is to be found in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, where he recognizes only 
moral considerations as permissible grounds for the justification of belief. Such a view is in 
radical contrast with the understanding of belief that we find, for example, in George 
Friedrich Meier, where belief is not based on moral grounds (cf. Pasternack 2011).3 These 
claims find support in Kant’s lectures on logic, where he highlights the differences between 
his use of the concepts of belief and moral certainty and the views of his predecessors and 
contemporaries. Kant’s account of these differences is in fact accurate as far as certain 
widespread views are concerned, but it conceals important elements of continuity with 
Christian August Crusius. 
In this paper, I argue that it is very likely that Crusius’s definition of belief and his account of 
practical grounds for assenting to merely probable propositions exerted influence on Kant’s 
conceptions of belief and practical justification. Not only is recognizing this influence 
significant from an historical point of view, but it has important consequences for how we 
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interpret Kant’s concept of belief. In particular, Andrew Chignell has argued that it is better to 
read Kantian belief as not involving ‘belief’ in our contemporary sense of the term.4 It is 
easier to make sense of Kantian belief if we understand it as a case of what has been called 
‘acceptance’. The latter is a firm assent that motivates action but lacks important elements of 
the phenomenology of belief, like the involuntary disposition to ‘feel’ that the proposition is 
true (Chignell 2007b: 341). As we will see, approaching Kantian belief from the standpoint of 
Crusius suggests that it is distinguishable from knowledge (the other case of firm assent for 
Kant) not because our assent ‘feels’ different but simply because the grounds that support and 
‘cause’ it are different. While Chignell agrees that the grounds for knowledge and Kantian 
belief are different, he tries to show that Kantian belief can plausibly be read as further 
distinguished from knowledge because it does not involve the ‘feeling of truth’ of full-blown 
belief. 
I begin (in section 2) by exploring Kant’s account of belief and how he presents the 
relationship between his views and their antecedents. In section 3, I then show that Crusius’s 
definition of belief is at odds with the German tradition preceding him in ways that anticipate 
Kant’s own approach. Given the esteem in which Kant held Crusius, it is plausible to think 
that these similarities rest on Crusius’s direct influence on Kant. I argue that Crusius’s 
influence on Kant finds confirmation in the former’s account of practical grounds for 
assenting to probable cognitions. Among these practical grounds, Crusius introduces a 
distinction between prudential and moral grounds, which most likely constitutes the basis for 
Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral beliefs. Finally, I argue (in section 4) that 
acknowledging Crusius’s influence on Kantian belief has consequences for how we 
understand the phenomenology of the latter. 
2. Kant on Belief and the Traditional Account 
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Kant situates his characterization of belief  within his account of assent, or taking-to-be-true 
(Fürwahrhalten). By the latter term, he understands a positive attitude towards a proposition, 
such that we take it to truly represent some state of affairs (cf. A822/B850; JL, 9: 65-6).5 In 
the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes between three kinds of assent: 
opinion (Meinung), belief (Glaube) and knowledge (Wissen). He claims that opinion is both 
subjectively and objectively insufficient, while belief is subjectively sufficient and objectively 
insufficient, and knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient (cf. A822/B850; 
JL, 9: 66). It is not easy to understand what Kant means by objective and subjective 
sufficiency.6 Since my purpose is to compare Kant’s views on practical justification with 
Crusius’s, however, it is enough to characterize subjective and objective sufficiency as 
follows: a subjectively sufficient assent is based on grounds that are sufficient to produce full 
approval of a proposition in a particular subject,7 whereas an objectively sufficient assent is 
based on grounds that are sufficient to warrant the truth of the proposition to which we 
assent.8 We can call the grounds that are at issue in the latter case ‘objective’. They identify 
different kinds of evidence (mathematical, empirical, etc.) that are intersubjectively 
recognizable as valid. The grounds that are relevant in the first case can instead be called 
‘subjective’. They can be either what we subjectively take to be objective grounds or 
distinctively subjective grounds that do not aim at objective validity.9 
According to this characterization of subjective and objective sufficiency, opinion can be 
understood as a provisional assent (cf. JL, 9: 66) in which we have enough objective grounds 
to consider the truth of a proposition more probable than its falsity. Still, these grounds are 
insufficient to warrant the truth of the proposition to which we assent and, subjectively, to 
produce full approval. On the other hand, knowledge is an assent in which we have objective 
grounds that warrant the truth of the proposition to which we assent. Such grounds are also 
able, subjectively, to produce full approval. Finally, belief is an assent in which, although we 
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do not have sufficient objective grounds that warrant the truth of the proposition to which we 
assent, we nonetheless have subjective grounds that not only produce but also warrant full 
approval of the proposition. Therefore, in the case of belief, subjective grounds have not only 
‘causal’ determining force over our approval but also justificatory force, which I will clarify 
in a moment. 
This description of belief needs specification, for it may seem that it licenses belief in cases 
where we lack sufficient objective grounds for assent but nonetheless take ourselves to have 
those grounds, thus fully approving the proposition in question.10 These cases are in fact 
explicitly ruled out by Kant, however, because in order for belief to obtain, we need to be 
conscious that the grounds we have are not objective and, consequently, that our assent is not 
a candidate for knowledge (cf. A822/B850). The only kind of subjective grounds that are 
permissible in cases of belief are then genuinely subjective grounds (more on these below), 
and not what we falsely take to be objective grounds. Similarly with opinion and knowledge. 
That is, when our evaluation of the objective grounds we have is mistaken, our assent cannot 
legitimately be considered either opinion or knowledge. Both for knowledge (Log-W, 24: 
852)11 and for opinion (cf. JL 9: 66), we need to be conscious of the actual objective grounds 
we have. 
Therefore, while the subjective grounds for opinion and knowledge seem simply to be a 
correct evaluation of the objective grounds we have, which produces an adequate subjective 
attitude toward the proposition (provisional approval for opinion and full approval for 
knowledge), subjective grounds for belief single out genuinely subjective grounds that are 
independent of objective ones. This explains why subjective grounds of belief have not only a 
‘causal’ determining force but also a justificatory force over our approval. In this case, it is 
the subjective grounds themselves that do the justificatory work. But how are these grounds to 
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be understood? For Kant, genuinely subjective grounds are practical in nature. They license a 
belief in a state of affairs because the latter is a condition for the realization of certain ends we 
pursue in practice. Kant’s thought seems to be the following: when the evidence we have 
leaves undecided whether a proposition is true or false (such that we lack sufficient objective 
grounds to decide the issue), we are rationally required to believe in that proposition if it 
identifies conditions that are necessary for the realization of ends we are pursuing. In other 
words, for Kant we cannot rationally pursue an end if we do not believe that the conditions 
for its attainment apply. For this reason, once we actually have this end and follow it in our 
actions, we are rationally required to believe that the conditions of its realization are satisfied 
even if we lack decisive evidence on the matter (cf. A823-4/B851-2). 
Having characterized the subjective grounds that are at play in cases of belief in this way, 
Kant distinguishes between kinds of belief by making reference to: (1) the contingent or 
necessary nature of the ends that are at stake, and (2) the possibility, or lack thereof, of 
differently evaluating, in different epistemic circumstances, the conditions for realizing the 
ends in question (cf. A823-4/B851-2). In this respect, with pragmatic beliefs the relevant ends 
are contingent (we are not rationally required to pursue them, or alternatively, the fact that we 
have them is dependent on contingent circumstances), and we would perhaps regard other 
states of affairs as conditions for their realization if the epistemic situation were different in 
relevant respects (for example, if we had more powerful means to obtain pertinent evidence, 
etc.) (cf. A824/B852). As an example, Kant presents the case of a doctor who must do 
something to cure a patient if the latter is to survive. The doctor has no decisive evidence to 
determine the disease, even though there are some hints that it is consumption. He is said to 
be required to act on the belief that the disease is consumption because this is the only way to 
save the patient’s life (cf. A823-4/B851-2). Here, the doctor’s end is contingent, not because 
he is not required to act in a certain way in that situation,12 but because his being in such a 
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situation is contingent.13 Moreover, the doctor would perhaps judge the patient’s condition 
differently in different epistemic circumstances. Had he better instruments at his disposal, for 
example, he would perhaps arrive at a different evaluation, and the proposition asserting that 
the patient has consumption would no longer describe a condition for the realization of his 
end (saving the patient).  
On the other hand, moral beliefs are beliefs where the ends are necessary (we are rationally 
required to pursue them) and we cannot but regard certain states of affairs as conditions for 
the realization of these ends (cf. A828/B856).14 The beliefs that can be viewed as moral in this 
sense are, for Kant, the belief in God and in the immortality of the soul.15 Such beliefs are 
conditions for the realization of the highest good, that is, of a world in which a particular 
degree of moral perfection corresponds to a particular degree of happiness (cf. A814/B842). 
The highest good is a necessary end for Kant since we are rationally required to pursue it as 
rational moral agents. Moreover, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are 
states of affairs we cannot but see as conditions for the realization of this end (cf. A 811/B 
839). The fact that we cannot evaluate these conditions differently seems here to depend on 
the fact that our epistemic situation cannot change in relevant ways with respect to the 
evaluation of these objects. We see these objects as conditions of reaching the highest good 
on the basis of rational reflection, which is not dependent on contingent empirical factors. 
Moreover, both God and the soul are transcendental objects; because they lie beyond the 
limits of possible experience, we cannot expect that our evidence for them will change. 
Kant calls the kind of certainty that is open to us in cases of moral belief ‘moral certainty’ (cf. 
A829/B857). Given that the ends that ground moral belief are rationally required, and given 
that our viewing the states of affairs identified in those beliefs as conditions for moral ends is 
not sensitive to changes in our epistemic situation, our belief in these conditions cannot be 
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viewed as rationally dispensable, and our assent can for this reason attain the status of moral 
certainty. 
As has been shown in the literature (Fonnesu 2011 and 2015; Pasternack 2001), Kant’s 
understanding of both belief and moral certainty deviates significantly from accounts of these 
concepts that were widespread in eighteenth-century Germany. Belief, on the one hand, was 
commonly defined as assent based on the testimony of others. This is the definition that we 
find, for example, in Christian Wolff (Wolff 1713: Ch. 7, § 19, 204) and George Friedrich 
Meier (Meier 1752: § 206), whose influence on Kant is without question (see also Reimarus 
1766: § 239 and Walch 1740: 1327-8). On the other hand, moral certainty was characterized 
as the certainty we can attain when absolute certainty is not within our reach. It can be 
understood as an inferior kind of certainty which is nonetheless sufficient for practical 
everyday life (Meier 1752: § 175) or as a different but equally trustworthy kind of certainty 
obtained not through demonstration but through a proposition’s having the highest possible 
degree of probability (Crusius 1747: §§ 361, 422; see also Walch 1740: 1310; on moral 
certainty see: Borghero 1983; Shapiro 1983, 2003; Daston 1988; Fonnesu 2011; Perinetti 
2014). 
In his lectures on logic, Kant himself signals these differences between his account of belief 
and moral certainty and the views held by the vast majority of his predecessors and 
contemporaries. Regarding belief, he argues that the fact that a cognition is based on the 
testimony of others cannot be the defining feature of belief. Testimony is just as reliable a 
source of evidence as experience. Consequently, there is nothing that prevents us from 
attaining knowledge by means of it: ‘so-called historical belief [that is, belief based on 
testimony; my note] cannot really be called belief, either, and cannot be opposed as such to 
knowledge, since it can itself be knowledge. Holding-to-be-true [Fürwahrhalten] based on 
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testimony is not distinguished from holding-to-be-true through one’s own experience either as 
to degree or as to kind’ (JL, 9: 68-9). As far as moral certainty is concerned, Kant clarifies 
that he does not understand the latter as having to do with probability, as many of his 
predecessors and contemporaries do: ‘[m]ost, almost all autores are completely unacquainted 
with moral certainty, and instead they take it in each case to be probability’ (Log-Bl, 24: 200).  
According to the picture I have drawn in this section, it would be easy to conclude that Kant 
advances an account of belief and practical justification for assent that is radically new with 
respect to widespread views in eighteenth-century Germany. This conclusion may in fact be 
true as far as certain widespread views are concerned. However, it conceals the fact that 
aspects of Kant’s position are actually anticipated in important respects by Crusius’s account 
of belief and practical justification. 
3. Crusius on Belief and Practical Justification 
It is correct to regard Crusius’s definition of moral certainty as traditional. On his account, 
moral certainty is the highest degree of probability that a proposition can have and has 
nothing to do with morality (Crusius 1747: §§ 361, 422). Things are different as regards 
Crusius’s concept of belief (Glaube), however.16 In this section, I will show that there is 
significant evidence that Crusius’s account of belief influenced Kant. This becomes apparent 
if we consider Crusius’s definition of belief and his account of practical grounds for assenting 
to only probable propositions. 
First, Crusius explicitly rejects the traditional identification of belief with assent based on the 
testimony of others: ‘that clarification that some give when they say that believing means as 
much as giving approval to a proposition on the basis of the testimony of another person is 
not adequate’ (Crusius 1744: § 344). Crusius motivates this claim by saying that we can 
clearly have cases of belief that are not supported by testimonial evidence (Crusius 1744: § 
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344). This critical stance toward the traditional definition of belief already displays a 
similarity with Kant’s approach. Further similarities abound when we consider Crusius’s own 
definition of belief. In the Anweisung vernünftig zu leben, Crusius characterizes belief in the 
broad sense as ‘that state of a rational spirit [Geist], in which his will decides to let a 
represented proposition count as true [als wahr gelten zu lassen] and to act according to it 
when the occasion arises [bey Gelegenheit], as long as this is not in turn prevented by other 
causes’ (Crusius 1744: § 334). A state of belief thus has two main features. It is a state in 
which (i) we take a proposition to be true and (ii) we are prepared to act on the basis of that 
proposition when the circumstances arise. This recalls what Kant says on belief in the Jäsche 
Logic, where he describes belief as assent which is ‘sufficient for action [genug zum 
Handeln]’ (9: 68n, translation altered; see also Refl 2793, 16: 513). 
While Kant’s characterization of belief as ‘sufficient for action’ is essentially restricted to the 
specific sense he attributes to this concept, for Crusius this is a property of belief ‘in a broad 
sense’, which he views as a synonym of assent or taking-to-be-true in general 
(Vorwahrhalten) (cf. Crusius 1747: § 447).17 Accordingly, in Weg zur Gewissheit und 
Zuverlässigkeit der Menschlichen Erkentniss, he describes assent in a very similar way, 
namely, as a ‘state in which we represent a proposition as true and decide to let it count as a 
true proposition [als einen wahren Satz gelten zu lassen] in our practice [Verfahren]’ (Crusius 
1747: § 444). Since assent, or belief in a broad sense, is characterized in terms of complete 
approval (vollständiger Beyfall) and a ‘readiness to act’, opinion (Meinung) does not count as 
a proper case of assent for Crusius, because with opinion our approval is incomplete 
(unvollständing) and insufficient for action (Crusius 1744: § 344). We know that opinion 
counts as a case of assent for Kant, which suggests that his concept of assent is more 
inclusive. The relevant difference between Crusius’s and Kant’s views on assent appears to be 
that for Kant ‘readiness to act’ according to a proposition is not a defining feature of assent in 
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general, 18 whereas it is a defining feature of belief on Kant’s specific understanding of the 
term.19 
While for Crusius belief in a broad sense is  the same thing as assent, belief in a narrow sense 
is ‘mere’ belief. This is an assent that lacks either demonstrative certainty or the certainty 
provided by immediate experience20 but in which we nonetheless fully assent to a proposition 
(cf. Crusius 1747: § 447, 1744: § 334). For our purposes, it is interesting to see what, 
according to Crusius, makes a belief in the narrow sense rational. Rational beliefs are either 
morally certain assents or assents in which ‘one, due to a cognized connection of a probability 
with one’s final ends, or also due to a legal obligation, deliberately represses one’s rising 
doubts and decides to accept [annehmen] as true the propositions to be believed and to act 
according to them as according to true propositions with complete approval [vollkommenem 
Beyfalle]’ (Crusius 1747: § 447). The first kind of rational belief simply identifies those cases 
in which the certainty we have regarding a proposition is obtained by following ‘the way of 
probability’, a procedure which establishes certainty by showing that a proposition has the 
highest degree of probability (Crusius 1747: §§ 361, 422). Since this understanding of rational 
belief connects the latter to well-grounded probable cognition, it cannot be assimilated to 
Kant’s approach to belief. By contrast, the second kind of rational belief displays relevant 
similarities with Kant’s view. In this case, beliefs are rational because they are related either 
to ‘final ends’ or to a ‘legal obligation’ we must adhere to in our practice. We saw that a 
relation to ends and moral obligation plays an essential role in Kant’s justification of belief. 
However, this may represent only a superficial analogy. In order to determine the actual ties 
between Crusius and Kant, we need to determine what role ‘final ends’ play in the 
justification of belief and what ‘legal obligation’ means in the quoted passage. In order to do 
this, I will now consider Crusius’s account of practical grounds of assent. 
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Recall, first, that for Kant the subjective grounds relevant to belief are distinctly practical and 
rest on the connection between the assent and our particular ends. Kant’s insight can be 
briefly put as follows: when a proposition is left undecided by the evidence we have, we are 
rationally required to believe it if the latter describes conditions for the realization of certain 
ends we pursue in our practice. Secondly, Kant distinguishes between pragmatic and moral 
beliefs by also focusing on the contingent or necessary character of the ends we pursue, where 
contingent ends are so-called ends of ‘prudence’ (Klugheit).21 There are striking continuities 
between Crusius and Kant with respect to both aspects of Kant’s approach. 
As far as the first aspect is concerned, in his account of the grounds for assent in the case of 
probable knowledge, Crusius distinguishes between grounds of the intellect, which ‘must lie 
in the quality [Beschaffenheit] of the propositions and in their relation to other propositions’ 
(1747: § 362), and grounds that ‘consist in the connection of the cognized thing with certain 
final ends’ (1747: § 412; cf. § 362). Here, grounds of the intellect seem to concern the 
determination of the probability of one proposition with respect to the probability of others. 
By contrast, the second kind of ground, which we might call practical, rests on an explicit 
connection with ends we pursue in practice. If we take into consideration one instance of 
these latter grounds, that is, those based on ends of prudence, it becomes apparent that 
Crusius’s account of practical justification has some elements in common with Kant’s. Thus 
Crusius explains the normative power that ends of prudence exert on our actions and assent as 
follows: ‘The obligation [Verbindlichkeit] of prudence … either originates in the fact that 
accepting the probable cognition and acting upon it is the only means to certain human final 
ends; or it is based on the consideration of the security of this means’ (1747: § 414). Let us 
first consider the case in which we have the ‘security of the means’: when we are certain on 
the basis of evidence (and here it is ‘moral’ certainty that is at stake, that is, certainty based on 
an extremely high probability) that some state of affairs obtains and that if we act according to 
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the proposition expressing that state of affairs we can realize certain of our ends, our ends 
command us to act on the basis of the certain proposition.22 By contrast, when, on a 
theoretical basis, we are not certain but have a merely probable cognition that a certain state 
of affairs obtains, and acting on the basis of the belief that it does is the only possible way to 
realize an end we have, we are rationally required to believe that that state of affairs obtains 
and to act on that belief. In this scenario, the truth of the proposition describing the state of 
affairs in question identifies conditions for the success of our action. Like Kant, Crusius thus 
argues that our ends can command our assent to a proposition if this proposition identifies 
conditions that are necessary for the realization of those ends. Therefore, it seems that for 
Crusius ‘final ends’ play a role in the justification of our assent that is very similar to the role 
played by ends in Kant. 
Turning to the second aspect of Kant’s approach to the justification of belief mentioned 
above, note that Crusius also distinguishes between two kinds of ends that can support our 
assent in the case of belief. These can be either ends of prudence (Klugheit) or ends of justice 
(Gerechtigkeit) (cf. 1747: § 362), and they are linked to two corresponding kinds of 
obligation (Verbindlichkeit): 
The same connection which the probable cognitions have with certain final ends and 
through which they can obtain a new weight consists in the fact that there is either an 
obligation of prudence [Verbindlichkeit der Klugheit] or a legal obligation [gesetzliche 
Verbindlichkeit] to act according to the probable cognition, and to be content with it. I 
call obligation of prudence that moral necessity in virtue of which we must do or refrain 
from doing [thun oder lassen] something, if we do not want to lose our own final ends. … 
On the other hand, a legal obligation is that moral necessity in virtue of which we must do 
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or refrain from doing something, if we do not want to disobey the will of a ruler 
[Oberherr] on whom we depend and to whom we are bound to be obedient. (1747: § 413) 
First, let me emphasize that both ends of prudence and ends of justice support our assent in 
the way I have just described. They justify our assent to a proposition that is only probable 
because acting on such assent is a condition for the realization of certain ends we have.23 
Moreover, ends of prudence seem to be very close to the contingent ends that are at issue in 
Kant’s pragmatic beliefs. Crusius accordingly characterizes ends of prudence as ends that we 
desire (begehren) according to our nature and that are contingent because we would not 
violate any indebtedness (Schuldigkeit) toward God if we failed to pursue them (Crusius 
1744: § 162). The obligation that they issue is therefore not necessary but dependent on the 
pursuit of a contingent end: if I have end E, I must do A to realize it. If the success of my 
action depends on the truth of the probable proposition P, however, I am also rationally 
required (and so justified) to believe in P. Moreover, the similarity between Kant’s pragmatic 
beliefs and Crusius’s assents based on ends of prudence is suggested by the fact that Crusius 
lists the ‘evaluation of most diseases’ as an instance in which an obligation of prudence can 
apply (1747: § 414), where this recalls Kant’s example of the doctor.  
One might think that ends of justice simply identify another kind of contingent end, which 
depends not on our personal inclinations but on the will of a ruler. This would be a mistake, 
however, since for Crusius the ‘ruler’ who grounds any kind of legal obligation is ultimately 
God (cf. Crusius 1753: § 481). Crusius’s line of thought can be briefly put as follows: God 
provides a law, which human beings are bound to follow (cf. Crusius 1744: § 161; Crusius 
1753: § 480). It is when human beings’ free actions agree with God’s law that they partake of 
virtue (Tugend) (cf. Crusius 1744: § 161). What Crusius calls ‘ends of justice’ must be 
clarified in this framework. These are ends that are based on our ‘indebtedness’ (Schuldigkeit) 
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and ‘obedience’ (Gehorsamkeit) to God (cf. Crusius 1744: § 165, 1753: § 481). In contrast to 
ends of prudence, they rest on a law that we must necessarily obey. As such, they can be 
considered necessary moral ends. But how should we understand the obligation on which 
ends of justice rest? How can the latter justify our assent? Even if the ‘legal obligation’ at 
stake here is not categorical in Kant’s sense, it expresses Crusius’s attempt to grasp an 
obligation that issues necessary duties. The justification in this case works as follows: as a 
free agent who is ‘indebted’ (schuldig) and obedient (gehorsam) to God, I must pursue end V; 
that is, I must pursue virtue. An action (or a course of action) A is necessary to obtain V. If the 
success of my action (or my course of action) depends on the truth of the probable proposition 
P, however, I am also rationally required (and justified) to believe in P. 
In order to see how Crusius’s approach actually works, we can take into consideration one of 
his proofs for the immortality of the soul. Both in the Anweisung and in the Entwurf der 
nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahreiten, Crusius presents a proof with the following form: as 
rational beings, we have the capacity to strive toward a final end which is described as either 
perpetual (ewig) (cf. Crusius 1744: § 219) or endlessly continuous (unendlich fortdauernd) 
(cf. Crusius 1753: § 483). By this Crusius seems to mean an end that requires a perpetual or 
endlessly continuous striving on our part. Insofar as God creates no capacity in vain, we must 
assume that rational beings are capable of endlessly pursuing this perpetual end. But this is 
only possible if the souls of rational beings are immortal (cf. Crusius 1744: § 219; cf. Crusius 
1753: § 483).  
If we stop here, it is unclear how this proof matches the model of argument based on legal 
obligation sketched above.To make this connection, we should observe that, according to 
Crusius, God’s own final end is to make ‘morally active creatures’ (moralisch wirkende 
Geschöpfe) happy, as long as they conform to, or partake of, virtue (Crusius 1753: § 479; cf. 
 16 
Crusius 1744: § 213). God’s own final end therefore has two elements: virtue, which demands 
a world where every free action agrees with God’s perfection (Crusius 1753: § 477), and 
happiness, which is given in proportion to the virtue that free agents have actually acquired 
(Crusius 1753: § 478).24 In the Entwurf, Crusius places God’s own final end at the very basis 
of the perpetual ends on which he builds his argument for the immortality of the soul (Crusius 
1753: § 483). Given that virtue and happiness are the two main elements of God’s own final 
end and that happiness is subordinated to virtue, it is then plausible to view virtue as the main 
and most important perpetual end in Crusius’s argument. But virtue is a necessary end insofar 
as we are bound to follow God’s law. This means that in this case, we do not simply have the 
capacity to follow this perpetual end but are rather bound to pursue it. Crusius’s argument can 
thus be interpreted as follows: as free agents who are indebted and obedient to God, we must 
pursue virtue. Given that this end is perpetual or endlessly continuous, we can only pursue it 
adequately if we have the capacity to endlessly progress toward virtue. But this is only 
possible if our soul is immortal. Given that the end of pursuing virtue is an end that God has 
set before us as necessary, and given that God does nothing in vain (vergeblich), we must 
have the capacity to endlessly pursue virtue and must therefore be immortal. 
Notice a few things about this argument. First, it seems to build on a form of the ‘ought-
implies-can’ principle. If we ought to pursue virtue, this means that we can do it, and 
immortality is a further condition of our capacity to do so. There is thus an inference from an 
‘ought’ to a ‘can’, but this is accomplished only indirectly, through God’s nature. Since God 
has given us this necessary and endless end, and since he does nothing in vain, it follows that 
we can also adequately pursue this end. Second, the fact that Crusius here provides ‘proof’ 
(Beweis) of the immortality of the soul does not mean that for him we can ‘know’ that we are 
immortal. Rational beliefs based on practical grounds also need ‘proof’ (Crusius 1744: § 340). 
What is distinctive about proof in support of practical beliefs is that it builds on obligation. 
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The argument I have reconstructed is based on our obligation to pursue virtue. Therefore, it 
must be taken as only establishing the rationality of belief in the immortality of the soul. This 
suggests that if there is an ‘ought-implies-can’ principle in Crusius’s proof, it cannot be taken 
in a strong sense as implying that we can infer that we ‘know’ that we are immortal. The 
principle can only show that if we regard ourselves as being under an obligation and there is 
no evidence that the conditions for satisfying this obligation do not obtain, we are rationally 
required to regard the satisfaction of that obligation as possible and, consequently, the states 
of affairs that are conditions of that possibility as obtaining. Read in these terms, Crusius’s 
argument displays important similarities with Kant’s argument for the postulate of 
immortality in the Critique of Practical Reason (cf. 5: 122-3).25 The main difference between 
the two is that in Crusius’s argument the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle, understood in the 
modest sense I have suggested, is only obtained by means of a reference to God, whereas in 
Kant it is assumed as a rational principle that stands on its own.26 
Let us briefly return to Crusius’s distinction between ends of prudence and ends of justice and 
between obligations of prudence and legal obligation. I have already suggested that ends of 
prudence seem to be very close to the contingent ends that are at issue in Kant’s pragmatic 
beliefs. I have also suggested that the obligation they issue is not necessary but dependent on 
the pursuit of a contingent end. From what I have just said, it seems plausible to read ends of 
justice in connection with the necessary ends that are at issue in Kant’s moral beliefs. Both 
for Kant and for Crusius, these ends rest on an obligation that necessarily binds us to act a 
certain way.27 There is an important difference, though. Whereas for Kant the obligation in 
question is grounded solely on the form of our rationality, for Crusius it is based on our 
‘indebtedness’ and ‘obedience’ to God. So Crusius’s legal obligation would not be categorical 
according to Kant, even though it is an attempt to grasp an obligation that is necessary and 
independent of subjective ends. Still, there are significant similarities between the two 
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accounts. Since we know that Kant possessed copies at least of the Anweisung and the 
Entwurf in his library (cf. Warda 1922: 47) and refers to Crusius’s Logic in his lectures (Log-
W, 24: 796), and since scholars have already pointed out Crusius’s influence on Kant in other 
respects (cf. Tonelli 1964), the easiest and most plausible way to account for these similarities 
is to hold that Crusius’s views on belief and practical justification had a direct influence on 
Kant. 
Let me conclude this section by considering a further aspect of Crusius’s account of practical 
grounds for assent. For Crusius, the strength with which these grounds support our assent is 
influenced by two factors: first, by the importance of the ends we are pursuing, and second, 
by whether we can remain neutral with respect to a proposition, or whether we are obliged to 
make a choice regarding its truth or falsity and to act on that choice (cf. Crusius 1747: § 362). 
The more important our ends and the lower the possibility of remaining neutral with respect 
to a proposition, the stronger the normative power of those ends to justify our assent and 
motivate our action  (cf. Crusius 1747: § 414). Kant does not discuss these two issues in his 
account of practical justification, even though, on the one hand, his distinction between 
pragmatic and moral beliefs can certainly be taken to imply a scale of importance among ends 
– a scale that we also find in Crusius’s distinction between ends of prudence and ends of 
justice. On the other hand, although Kant does not explicitly mention that the possibility of 
remaining neutral with respect to a proposition influences our practical justification in 
assenting to it, this does seem to be the upshot of some of his examples. Consider again 
Kant’s example of the doctor. Here, the matter of whether the doctor’s choice to act on the 
belief that the patient has consumption is necessary or avoidable is clearly relevant to his 
justification. 
4. The Phenomenology of Practical Belief in Crusius and Kant 
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According to my reconstruction, both Crusius and Kant regard practically justified beliefs as 
beliefs that we are ‘rationally required’ to accept given certain ends we pursue and the lack of 
evidence against those beliefs. What does this mean? In what sense can I be ‘required’ to have 
a belief? Take again Kant’s example of the doctor. Why is the doctor ‘required’ to believe 
that the patient has consumption? It seems plausible to say that he is required to act on the 
assumption that the patient has consumption, but this should not have any implications for 
what his psychological state must be.  
Andrew Chignell has tried to make sense of Kant’s claim by suggesting that Kant could 
indeed mean that, in order to act rationally, the doctor is required to firmly assent to the 
proposition that the patient has consumption. This should, however, not imply that the doctor 
is required to be in a psychological state in which he ‘feels’ that the proposition is true 
(Chignell 2007b: 341). According to this approach, the attitude we are required to have in 
Kantian belief is similar to what in contemporary philosophy is called ‘acceptance’: ‘a 
voluntary species of  firm assent that motivates assertion and action in a certain context, but 
which is justified by its nonepistemic merits rather than by objective grounds, and so lacks the 
characteristic phenomenology of belief (the involuntary disposition to ‘feel’ that the 
proposition is true, for instance)’ (Chignell 2007b: 341).28 Chignell remains neutral on the 
issue of whether Kantian belief involves full-blown belief or only acceptance, understood in 
this sense (Chignell 2007b: 342), but he tries to establish whether Kant’s account of belief is 
defensible, once we understand it as only involving acceptance. Does Kantian belief only 
involve acceptance, or does it involve full-blown belief? If the latter, what could it mean to 
say that the doctor in Kant’s example is ‘required’ to believe that his patient has 
consumption? Approaching this question from the standpoint of Crusius’s influence on Kant 
suggests that Kantian belief might indeed involve full-blown belief, or at least a certain 
‘feeling’ of truth. 
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Crusius describes assent as a mixed ‘effect’ (Wirkung) of our intellect and will (Crusius 1747: 
§ 445; see also Crusius 1744: §§ 335-6). This seems to mean that assent is ‘caused’ by the 
recognition of the grounds for assent that we have,29 grounds that lie both in the intellect and 
in the will.30 In this context, grounds of the intellect encompass both demonstrations and 
proofs through probability, whereas grounds of the will come from the relationship between a 
proposition and our ends. Crusius makes clear that treating grounds of the will as possible 
causes of assent does not open the way to the view that we are easily victims of wishful 
thinking. Crusius’s idea is that it is in the nature of our will to follow the intellect as a guide 
(Richtshnur) in our actions. Our will is naturally inclined not to act on the basis of 
propositions against which there are grounds of the intellect. Moreover, when grounds of the 
intellect are lacking, the will motivates us to search for them in order to better decide how to 
act.  
Why are these remarks relevant to determining the phenomenology of practical belief 
according to Crusius? First, the claim that assent is an ‘effect’ of both grounds of the intellect 
and grounds of the will suggests that it is understood as a psychological state caused by our 
representation of those grounds. Second, grounds of the intellect and grounds of the will are 
described as the two elements that contribute to the occurrence of the same state. This seems 
to imply that an assent that is essentially based on grounds of the will (like beliefs based on 
ends of prudence or ends of justice) is not distinguishable from an assent based on grounds of 
the intellect when it comes to the features it possesses as the psychological state that it is. 
What distinguishes these states are rather the grounds that produce and justify them. 
Therefore, if ‘feeling’ that a given proposition to which we assent is true is crucial to that 
assent’s being based on grounds of the intellect (considered as the psychological state that it 
is), this feature should be part of an assent based on grounds of the will as well, since the 
latter is not distinguishable from the former when considered simply as a psychological state. 
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Where does this leave us? Does this mean that for Crusius we are rationally required to ‘feel’ 
that a certain proposition is true when it describes conditions for realizing ends that we 
pursue? It is not necessary to ascribe this implausible view to Crusius. Rather, it is more 
accurate to view Crusius as making two different points. The first concerns the rationality of 
our actions and beliefs. Here, the idea is that in order to pursue an end rationally, I must 
believe that the conditions that make the realization of that end possible obtain. This need not 
mean that we are ‘rationally required’ to ‘feel’ that those conditions obtain (or that the 
proposition describing those conditions is true). It may simply mean that if we act as if those 
conditions obtain without believing that they do, we have an inconsistent system of attitudes. 
If this is true, it means that if we actually have the belief in question and so ‘feel’ that the 
conditions described by the belief obtain, then our belief can be considered rational and 
justified. 
The second point concerns the psychology of belief based on practical grounds. It provides an 
explanation of how grounds of the will can cause an assent in which we ‘feel’ that a certain 
proposition is true. We have seen that Crusius defines assent in general as a state in which we 
take a proposition to be true and are ‘ready to act’ according to that proposition (Crusius 
1744: § 334, 1747: § 444). Let us assume that Crusius thinks not only that assent implies 
‘readiness to act’ according to a proposition but also that in order to be ‘ready to act’ 
according to a proposition we must assent to it. Understood in these terms, Crusius’s account 
of assent in general involves a claim regarding our psychology: we cannot be ‘ready to act’ 
according to a proposition if we do not assent to it, if we do not believe – in the contemporary 
sense of the word – that the state of affairs it describes obtains.31 The psychological story 
involved in Crusius’s account of belief based on practical grounds might be the following. In 
these cases, we have an obligation to act according to a proposition that, on the basis of 
‘grounds of the intellect’, is only probable. It is, however, a fact of our psychology that we 
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cannot be ‘ready to act’ according to the proposition in question if we do not believe that it is 
true. Therefore, the fact that we recognize that we are under an obligation, whether prudential 
or legal, counts as a ‘ground of the will’ that causes us fully to assent to the proposition in 
question. Otherwise, we would not be in the psychological state of being ‘ready to act’ 
according to our obligation. Of course, saying that ‘grounds of the will’ can exert this causal 
force on our assent does not mean that we can ignore ‘grounds of the intellect’. The 
proposition we end up believing must be probable according to those grounds. Crusius can 
thus explain how grounds of the will can ‘cause’ us to be in a psychological state in which we 
are ‘ready to act’ according to an obligation and consequently also ‘feel’ that a certain 
proposition is true. 
Since Kant claims that belief, on his technical understanding of the term, is ‘sufficient for 
action’ (JL, 9: 68n; see also Refl 2793, 16: 513), it is at least plausible that his story about the 
psychology of belief approaches the one I have reconstructed with the help of Crusius. This 
seems to be confirmed by a passage in the Jäsche Logic: ‘The greater a man’s moral 
sentiment, the firmer and more lively will be his belief in all that he feels himself necessitated 
to accept and to presuppose out of moral interest, for practically necessary purposes’ (9: 70). 
Note that moral sentiment can affect the liveliness (Lebendigkeit) of a belief, where this has 
the consequence that we ‘feel’ we are necessitated to accept the truth of a certain proposition. 
This passage points to a view close to Crusius’s, where ‘grounds of the will’ can ‘cause’ us to 
be in a psychological state that enables us to act as we ought to. In Kant’s general account of 
assent, this can explain how belief, when considered merely as a psychological state, can 
‘feel’ like other forms of firm assent, such as knowledge. Of course, this does not mean that, 
subjectively, we do not have means to distinguish between knowledge and belief. We can 
distinguish between knowledge and belief because we recognize that the grounds we have for 
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each are different in nature. This is compatible with saying that these forms of assent are 
indistinguishable if we limit ourselves to what they ‘feel like’.  
5. Conclusion 
It is certainly true that Kant’s definition of belief deviates significantly from widespread 
eighteenth-century German views. This does not imply, however, that his account of belief 
and practical justification more generally is not indebted to certain of his predecessors and 
contemporaries.  
As I have shown in this paper, there is significant evidence that Crusius exerted influence on 
Kant’s account of belief and practical justification. As far as belief is concerned, he is 
presumably the source of Kant’s claim that belief implies a certain ‘readiness to act’ on a 
proposition when the right circumstances arise. Furthermore, in a way that anticipates Kant’s 
own view on practical belief, Crusius describes rational belief as assent with respect to a 
merely probable proposition that identifies conditions for the realization of certain of our 
ends. Moreover, Crusius distinguishes between two kinds of ends that can play this 
justificatory role with respect to our assent: ends of prudence and ends of justice. He also 
connects them with two different kinds of obligation: prudential and legal. While ends of the 
first kind are contingent and issue only hypothetical obligations, ends of the second kind are 
necessary because they are based on our indebtedness and obedience to God. Given the 
esteem in which Kant held Crusius, it is plausible to think that these distinctions lay at the 
basis of Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral beliefs.  
Viewing Kant’s account of belief as having been influenced by Crusius has consequences for 
how we interpret the phenomenology of Kantian belief. In this respect, I have suggested that 
both Crusius and Kant think that practical belief is a psychological state in which we ‘feel’ 
that a proposition is true. I have also suggested that they have a psychological story regarding 
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how this feeling arises. This story builds on an assumption about our psychology: the claim 
that in order to be ‘ready to act’ according to a proposition, we must fully assent (where full 
assent involves a ‘feeling of truth’) to the proposition in question. This is not to deny that 
Kant introduced important innovations. By divorcing moral obligation from our obedience to 
God, for example, he was able to construct a moral proof of the existence of God without 
incurring the risk of circularity. Whether that proof is successful, of course, is another 
question.32  
Notes
 
1 This growth of attention to Kant’s concept of belief goes hand in hand with an increasing 
interest in the problem of practical, non-evidentialist approaches to justification. See for 
example McCormick 2015; Marušić 2015. 
2 Fonnesu (2011) identifies an exception as far as moral certainty is concerned. He shows that 
Johann Heinrich Lambert understood moral certainty as being based on moral judgements. 
Since the focus of this article is on Kantian belief, the question of whether Lambert was an 
influence on Kant’s understanding of moral certainty goes beyond its scope. 
3 Against this view, Dyck (2018) argues that Meier recognizes moral grounds for belief in the 
immortality of the soul. Given the extensive similarities between Kant’s definition of belief 
and Crusius’s (similarities that we do not find in Meier’s definition of belief), it seems to me 
more compelling to view Kant as having been influenced by Crusius than to view him as 
having been influenced by Meier. 
4 To be clear: I also think that Kantian belief deviates from our current understanding of 
belief, not because it necessarily lacks a ‘feeling of truth’, but rather because it identifies only 
a special case of what we today call belief. 
5 References to Kant’s works will be given according to the standard edition (1900-), 
indicating volume and page number. Translations are given according to those in P. Guyer 
and A. W. Wood (eds), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992-). I will use the following abbreviations: CPrR = Critique 
of Practical Reason; JL = Logik (ed. Jäsche); Log-Bl = Logik Blomberg; Log-D = Logik 
Dohna-Wundlacken; Log-W = Wiener Logik; Refl = Reflexionen. References to the Critique 
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of Pure Reason will use A and B to refer to the pagination of the first and second original 
editions, respectively. 
6 Scholars have provided very different interpretations of these concepts (cf. Stevenson 2003; 
Chignell 2007a, 2007b; Pasternack 2014; Höwing 2016; Gava and Willaschek forthcoming). 
One way to display the difficulties faced by the interpreter in this respect is to compare the 
Jäsche Logic with the Canon of Pure Reason. In the former, Kant distinguishes between 
subjective and objective grounds and suggests that these grounds can be either sufficient or 
insufficient for assent (cf. JL, 9: 66-80). In the Canon, by contrast, he refrains from speaking 
of subjective grounds, which may suggest that the distinction between subjective and 
objective grounds is not relevant to understanding that between subjective and objective 
sufficiency. 
7 I use ‘approval’ instead of the more natural ‘acceptance’ to avoid confusion with the 
contemporary use of ‘acceptance’ picked up by Chignell. 
8 Objective sufficiency can, however, be read in a more modest way if one follows Kant’s 
characterizations of conviction (Überzeugung). See for example Gava 2016. 
9 For a similar distinction within subjective grounds, see Stevenson 2003, Chignell 2007b. For 
an attempt to portray subjective grounds in a more unitary way, see Höwing 2016.  
10 This is in fact a paradigm case of what Kant calls persuasion (Überredung). 
11 This seems also to be implied in what Kant says in the Jäsche Logic. There, he identifies 
knowledge with certainty (9: 70) and claims that certainty ‘is combined with consciousness of 
necessity’ (9: 66). 
12 In fact, it seems plausible to say that he is obligated to try to save the patient’s life. 
13 On the contrary, necessary moral ends, like the end of realizing the highest good, are ends 
that we necessarily have as rational human beings, independently of the contingent 
circumstances of our lives. 
14 In the Canon, Kant identifies a further kind of belief, which he calls doctrinal (cf. A825-
7/B853-5). For the purposes of this paper, it can be left to the side. On doctrinal beliefs see 
Chignell 2007b, Pasternack 2010, Pickering 2016, Gava forthcoming. 
15 I am listing only God and the immortality of the soul and not freedom as matters of moral 
belief for two reasons. First, freedom is not considered a matter of belief in the Canon of Pure 
Reason. Second, even in the Critique of Practical Reason, it is not clear if freedom has the 
same status of the other postulates. See Stern 2016. 
16 Many scholars have emphasized interesting features of Crusius’s account of probable 
knowledge (cf. Danneberg 1994, Alexander 1996, Scholz 2009, Spoerhase 2009, Gelfert 
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2010, Perinetti 2014), but no one, at least to my knowledge, has thrown light on his account 
of belief and practical justification. 
17 Fonnesu (2015) claims that it is Kant who introduced the word Fürwahrhalten into the 
German vocabulary. However, Crusius’s Vorwahrhalten is only a different spelling of the 
same word. In fact, Kant himself used this spelling in the 1781 edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, even though this was not preserved in the Akademie-Ausgabe of that work. I thank an 
anonymous referee for pointing out to me that this was the spelling used by Kant in 1781. 
18 Leaving this aspect of assent aside, Kant’s and Crusius’s descriptions of it often otherwise 
converge. For Kant, it is ‘the subjective validity of judgment’ (A822/B850), or ‘the judgment 
through which something is represented as true’ (JL, 9: 66). For Crusius, it is ‘the approval 
[Beyfall] in the human soul in general’, or ‘the state [Zustand] in which we represent a 
proposition as true’ (Crusius 1747: § 444). 
19 One might ask why knowledge cannot be described as also implying a ‘readiness to act’ 
according to a known proposition. After all, our assent is in this case based on grounds that 
warrant the truth of the proposition in question. Kant might indeed agree that knowledge 
implies a ‘readiness to act’ according to the known proposition, but he might have thought 
that this was not a point that needed to be made because it is intuitively acceptable. He 
explicitly attributes this characteristic only to belief because in this case we are ready to act 
according to the believed proposition, and justifiably so, even if we lack sufficient objective 
grounds of assent. 
20 Crusius includes distinct sensations (deutliche Empfindungen) among the sources of 
immediate certainty (cf. Crusius 1747: § 446). 
21 In his logic lectures, Kant explicitly connects the assent we have in cases of pragmatic 
belief to rules of prudence: ‘That which is certain according to rules of prudence can be called 
not morally, but rather pragmatically certain’ (Log-D, 24: 734). 
22 One might ask why Crusius views cases in which we have ‘security of the means’ as falling 
under obligations of prudence. In this case, our assent to the proposition that guides our action 
seems in fact to be justified on theoretical grounds. This worry can be overcome, however, if 
we realize that obligations of prudence apply first of all to our actions and only secondarily to 
our beliefs. Thus, we can be certain, on a theoretical basis, that some states of affairs that are 
conditions for the realization of certain of our ends obtain. An obligation of prudence in this 
case would simply require us to act on our certain assent. On the other hand, if, from a 
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theoretical point of view, it is only probable that some states of affairs that are conditions for 
the realization of our ends obtain, the obligation of prudence would apply to both our action 
and our assent. It would require us to act in a way that maximizes our chances of reaching our 
ends, where this indirectly requires us to believe that those states of affairs that are conditions 
for the realization of those ends obtain. 
23 One could object that in these passages Crusius is talking not about justification but about 
how an obligation can add ‘weight’ to a proposition. Moreover, belief is not explicitly 
mentioned, so why should we see these passages as identifying those practical grounds that 
can justify our belief? It is Crusius himself who, when he defines rational beliefs in Weg zur 
Gewissheit (1747: § 447), refers back to § 413 as the paragraph where he discusses the 
practical grounds that can support rational beliefs. This makes clear that Crusius’s discussion 
in § 413 and related paragraphs: (a) is relevant to the topic of belief, and (b) is relevant to the 
justification of belief, since the grounds discussed in these paragraphs are those that can make 
a belief rational. I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
24 The similarity to Kant’s account of the highest good is evident, but I want here to focus on 
another point. This similarity has already been emphasized by Schmucker (1961: 83). 
25 For a very useful analysis of Crusius’s proofs of the immortality of the soul and their 
importance for Kant, see Rumore 2018. Rumore argues that Crusius anticipates Kant’s 
argument for the postulate of immortality, but she bases her claim on Crusius’s proof, which 
builds on the necessity of an afterlife when it comes to reward or punishment of our good and 
bad actions. It seems to me that the proof based on the ‘endlessly continuous’ nature of the 
pursuit of virtue is much closer to Kant’s approach in the Critique of Practical Reason. 
26 For a modest reading of the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle in Kant that interprets it as 
devised to support Kant’s arguments in the postulates, see Stern 2004. A formulation of the 
principle in Kant that clearly points in this direction is the following: ‘It is a duty to realize 
the highest good to the utmost of our capacity; therefore it must be possible; hence it is also 
unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective 
possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in relation to which alone it is 
valid’ (see CPrR, 5: 143n). 
27 Schmucker (1961: 83-5) insists on the importance of Crusius’s account of obligation for the 
development of Kant’s ethics. For a criticism of Schmucker in this regard, see Schwaiger 
1999.  
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28 A different strategy is pursued by Willaschek (2016: 139), who claims that for Kant the 
confidence that is necessary for belief can sometimes be very low, such that the doctor need 
not have high confidence in the truth of the proposition that the patient has consumption. 
Kant’s point is rather that this confidence should be ‘sufficient for action’, and it is in this 
sense that the doctor is required to believe that the patient has consumption. 
29 Of course, we can be wrong in thinking we have grounds of assent, where this erroneous 
representation can cause assent. 
30 This claim might seem implausible since it suggests that we cannot have cases of assent 
based solely on grounds of the intellect. What Crusius means is rather that even in those cases 
where we base our assent solely on grounds of the intellect, we do so because this is the most 
reasonable thing to do when deciding how to act (Crusius 1747: § 445). 
31 Of course, a defender of the distinction between belief (in the contemporary sense) and 
‘acceptance’ would challenge this thesis and claim that acceptance is sufficient for action, 
even though it lacks the phenomenology of belief. Crusius cannot offer an answer to this 
objection since the distinction between belief (in the contemporary sense) and acceptance was 
not available to him. Providing an answer to this objection in the spirit of Crusius would 
involve arguing that ‘readiness to act’ requires an assent that has the phenomenology of belief 
(in the contemporary sense). 
32 I would like to thank Andrew Chignell, Roe Fremstedal, Jakob Huber, JP Messina, Marcus 
Willaschek, three anonymous referees from Kantian Review and the audiences of a meeting of 
the American Philosophical Association in Baltimore and of Marcus Willaschek’s 
Colloquium in Frankfurt for very useful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. 
 
References 
Alexander, W. (1996) ‘Pluraque credimus, paucissima scimus. Zur Diskussion über 
philosophische und hermeneutische Wahrscheinlichkeit in der ersten Hälfte des 18. 
Jahrhunderts’. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 78, 130-65. 
Borghero, C. (1983) La certezza e la storia: Cartesianesimo, pirronismo e conoscenza 
storica. Milano: F. Angeli. 
 29 
Chignell, A. (2007a) ‘Kant’s Concepts of Justification’. Noûs, 41, 33-63. 
— (2007b) ‘Belief in Kant’. Philosophical Review, 116, 323-60. 
Crusius, C. A. (1744) Anweisung vernünftig zu leben. Leipzig. 
— (1747) Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der Menschlichen Erkentniss. Leipzig. 
— (1753) Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahreiten, 2nd edition. Leipzig. 
Danneberg, L. (1994) ‘Probabilitas hermeneutica. Zu einem Aspekt der Interpretations-
Methodologie in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts’. Aufklärung, 8, 27-48. 
Daston, L. (1988) Classical Probability in the Enlightenment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Dyck, C. (2018) ‘G.F. Meier and Kant on the Belief in the Immortality of the Soul’. In C. 
Dyck and F. Wunderlich (eds), Kant and his German Contemporaries (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 76-93. 
Fonnesu, L. (2011) ‘Kant on Moral Certainty’. In L. Cataldi Madonna and P. Rumore (eds), 
Kant und die Aufklärung (Hildesheim: Olms), pp. 183-204. 
— (2015) ‘Kant on Private Faith and Public Knowledge’. Rivista di Filosofia, 106, 361-90. 
Gava, G. (2016) ‘The Fallibilism of Kant’s Architectonic’. In G. Gava and R. Stern (eds), 
Pragmatism, Kant and Transcendental Philosophy (London: Routledge), pp. 46-66. 
— (forthcoming) ‘Sind die regulativen Ideen ein doktrinaler Glaube? Über die Rechtfertigung 
des regulativen Gebrauchs der Ideen im Anhang zur transzendentalen Dialektik’. In V. L. 
Waibel und M. Ruffing (eds), Akten des 12. internationalen Kant-Kongresses ( Berlin: De 
Gruyter). 
Gava, G. and Willaschek, M. (forthcoming) ‘The Transcendental Doctrine of Method of the 
Critique of Pure Reason’. In S. Baiasu and M. Timmons (eds), The Kantian Mind 
(London: Routledge). 
 30 
Gelfert, A. (2010) ‘Kant and the Enlightenment’s Contribution to Social Epistemology’. 
Episteme, 7, 79-99. 
Höwing, T. (2016) ‘Kant on Opinion, Belief and Knowledge’. In T. Höwing (ed.), The 
Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy (Berlin: De Gruyter), pp. 201-22. 
Kant, I. (1900-), Kants gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: De Gruyter, Reimer.  
Marušić, B. (2015) Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McCormick, M. (2015) Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief. New 
York: Routledge. 
Meier, G. F. (1752) Auszug auf der Vernunftlehre. Halle. 
Pasternack, L. (2010) ‘Kant’s Doctrinal Belief in God’. In O. Thorndike (ed.), Rethinking 
Kant, Vol. 3 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), pp. 200-18. 
— (2011) ‘The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief: The Highest Good, The Practical 
Postulates and The Fact of Reason’. Kant-Studien, 102, 290-315. 
— (2014) ‘Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic’. 
Kant-Studien, 105, 41-82. 
Perinetti, D. (2014) ‘Ways to Certainty’. In A. Garrett (ed.), The Routledge Companion to 
Eighteenth Century Philosophy (London: Routledge), pp. 265-93. 
Pickering, M. (2016) ‘Kant’s Theoretical Reasons for Belief in Things in Themselves’. Kant-
Studien, 107, 589-616. 
Reimarus, H. S. (1766) Vernunftlehre, als eine Anweisung zum richtigen Gebrauche der 
Vernunft in der Erkenntniß der Wahrheit, 3rd Edition. Hamburg. 
Rumore, P. (2018) ‘Kant and Crusius on the Role of Immortality in Morality’. In C. Dyck and 
F. Wunderlich (eds), Kant and his German Contemporaries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 213-31. 
 31 
Schmucker, J. (1961) Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und 
Reflektionen. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hein. 
Scholz, O. R. (2009) ‘Von Rom, den Antipoden und von Wundern: Das Zeugnis anderer in 
Logiken der Neuzeit’. In C. Spoerhase, D. Werle and M. Wild (eds), Unsicheres Wissen: 
Skeptizismus und Wahrscheinlichkeit 1550-1850 (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 245-68. 
Schwaiger, C. (1999) Kategorische und andere Imperative. Zur Entwicklung von Kants 
praktischer Philosophie bis 1785. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog. 
Shapiro, B. (1983) Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the 
Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
— (2003) A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Spoerhase, C. (2009) ‘Die ‘mittelstrasse’ zwischen Skeptizismus und Dogmatismus: 
Konzeptionen hermeneutischer Wahrscheinlichkeit um 1750’. In C. Spoerhase, D. Werle 
and M. Wild (eds), Unsicheres Wissen: Skeptizismus und Wahrscheinlichkeit 1550-1850 
(Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 269-300. 
Stern, R. (2004) ‘Does “Ought” Imply “Can”? And Did Kant Think It Does?’ Utilitas, 16, 42-
61. 
Stern, R. (2016) ‘Round Kant or Through Him? On James’s Arguments for Freedom, and 
Their Relation to Kant’s’. In G. Gava and R. Stern (eds), Pragmatism, Kant and 
Transcendental Philosophy (London: Routledge), pp. 152-76. 
Stevenson, L. (2003) ‘Opinion, Belief or Faith, and Knowledge’. Kantian Review, 7, 72-100. 
Tonelli, G. (1964) ‘Vorwort’. In Crusius, C. A., Die philosophischen Hauptwerke, vol. 1., ed. 
G. Tonelli (Hildesheim: Olms). 
Walch,  J.G. (1740) Philosophisches Lexikon, 2nd Edition. Leipzig. 
Warda, A. (1922) Immanuel Kants Bücher. Berlin: Martin Breslauer. 
 32 
Willaschek, M. (2016) ‘Kant and Peirce on Belief’. In G. Gava and R. Stern (eds) 
Pragmatism, Kant and Transcendental Philosophy (London: Routledge), pp. 133-51. 
Wolff, C. (1713) Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und 
ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit. Halle. (Reprinted in: C. Wolff, 
Gesammelte Werke, ed. J. Ecole, H. W. Arndt, R. Theis, W. Schneiders, S. Carboncini-
Gavanelli [Hildesheim: Olms, 1962-], Abt. 1, Bd. 1.) 
 
